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ISSUE DEFINITION 
The United States is now running a deficit of over $100 billion in its 
foreign trade and the Federal budget is in the red by roughly $200 billion. 
To deal with these two deficits, Congress is considering a temporary import 
surcharge. This brief examines the case for and against such a surcharge as 
well as its use against Japan. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
The Case for an Import Surcharge 
The case for an import surcharge is straightforward: 
- - Imports should be taxed to offset the "subsidyw of 30% to 
40% which is given to foreign goods as the result 
of the overvalued dollar. Such a tax would reduce imports 
and ease the heavy burden placed on U.S. industry and 
labor. 
- - An import surcharge of 20% the first year would 
raise $60 to $75 billion in Government revenue, making a 
sizeable reduction in the budget deficit. A reduction.in 
the budget deficit should bring down interest rates and the 
overvalued dollar. Moreover, with a smaller budget 
.deficit, U.S. monetary policy could be eased (to maintain 
the pace of economic recovery and avoid a rise in 
unemployment), putting further downward pressure on 
interest rates and the dollar. 
- - Since foreign expcrters to the United States would want 
to preserve their market shares in the face of a temporary 
tax, they would probably absorb part of the tax, 
especially on manufactured goods. While this would reduce 
government revenue and slow the cut in imports, it implies 
that foreigners would be paying part of the surcharge. 
(Such "payment," however, would be to the national 
economy not to the U.S. Treasury.) 
Clearly, such developments would benefit U.S. industry, agriculture and 
home buyers and builders. 
The Case Against an Import Surcharge 
The case against an import surcharge rests on three arguments: 
- - Though the surcharge would reduce U.S. imports, it would 
do so at the expense of U.S. exports; they would fall if, as 
is likely, the dollar were to rise, and foreign incomes were 
to fall as their exports to the United States were reduced, 
and if foreign countries retaliated, as is possible. 
- - The import surcharge would raise serious economic and 
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political problems in U.S. relations with other 
countries; 
-- Most of the positive benefits of the surcharge flow from 
the fact that the revenues collected would reduce the 
budget deficit. 
An import tax is not the best tax to use to reduce 
the budget deficit. 
Let us run through the economic and political analysis of an import tax in 
more detail. 
1. Coverage of surcharge: The basic proposal is to 
have the surcharge applied to all U.S. imports. 
There is reason to expect pressure from our neighbors in 
the Western Hemisphere to be exempt from the surcharge: -- One-fifth of U.S. imports come from Canada. It 
depends very heavily on exports to the United States 
for its economic growth. Indeed, 20% of Canada's output 
is exported to the United States. Moreover, it has 
an agreement with us providing for duty-free trade in 
automobiles. The import surcharge would hinder 
Canada's economy and abrogate the automobile agreement. 
- - Thirty percent of U.S. imports come from Mexico, 
Brazil, Argentina and the other large international 
debtors. They depend on exports to the United States 
to pay off their debts and to pull themselves out of 
the deepest recession since the 1930's. The 
surcharge would constitute a major obstacle to their 
continued recovery and their ability to pay on 
their heavy indebtedness to U.S. banks. 
If exports from the Western Hemisphere were exempted from 
the surcharge, as seems quite possible, the revenues. raised 
would be cut in half. 
From a commodity rather than country point-of-view, would 
the tax be applied to the one-third of U.S. imports 
which are duty-free? By and large, they are used as inputs 
for U.S. manufacturing or do not compete directly with U.S. 
products; and taxing them would raise prices to U.S. users. 
Second, would the surcharge apply to goods that are protected 
by quotas, notably steel, textiles and apparel? Such goods 
were exempted from Nixon's 1971 import surcharge of 10%. 
2. Retaliation and other Repercussions: There would 
be great pressure for the European Community (EC) to retaliate 
against the U.S. surcharge, even in the unlikely event that it 
were found to be consistent with U.S. obligations under the 
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). The European 
Parliament (of the EC) has passed a resolution proposing 
retaliation and several spokesmen for the Community have 
endorsed the idea. Indeed, some Europeans are looking for 
opportunities to restrict specific U.S. exports, notably 
soybeans. If there were retaliation, it would hurt 
U.S. exports, offsetting some of the hoped-for trade benefits. 
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Despite the parliamentary resolution, it is far from 
certain that the Community would retaliate. The member 
governments would find it difficult to agree on a course of 
action. 
More likely than retaliation would be emulation. Other 
countries would feel freer to use import surcharges. 
While the United States imposed an import 
surcharge in 1971, that was in a period of 
fixed exchange rates. To do so today, in a world 
of flexible exchange rates, would establish a precedent. 
It is interesting to note that a 20% surcharge on 
all imports (dutiable and non-dutiable) would make the 
United States more protectionist than it has been in modern 
times. Today's overall average of 3 %  would go to 
23%; the Smoot-Hawley tariff raised the average to 20% 
(though the average charge on dutiable goods alone was about 
59%); only in 1906 did average U.S. tariffs reach 
24%. The United States has quotas on imports of textiles 
and apparel, steel and other goods today, while such quotas 
were not applied significantly before World War 11. 
It seems clear that a surcharge would exacerbate relations 
with our major allies, divert attention from, and probably 
undercut, U.S. proposals for a new round of trade negotiations, 
and set a dangerous precedent for dealing with trade 
problems in a world in which such problems were to be met by 
flexible exchange rates and sensible domestic policies. 
3. Economic Analysis of the Surcharge: Because the 
impact of the proposed surcharge works directly on two 
factors -- imports and the budget deficit -- it makes sense 
to simplify the problem and consider separately the 
repercussions of each of these two factors on the 
economy: 
a. Imports. The surcharge would, at least initially, 
cut imports. The amount and duration of the cut depend 
on how much of the tax is absorbed by the foreign 
exporter (or U.S. importer), the sensitivity of 
U.S. demand to the new price and, the movement of the 
exchange rate. 
Without taking account of the trade effects 
produced by the reduction in the budget deficit, 
the initial cut in imports would tend to bring a 
virtually equal cut in exports. This is so because 
the fall in imports would see fewer dollars being 
made available to the foreign exchange market. As a 
result, the dollar would rise. In addition, the surcharge 
would lead to higher U.S. prices and, consequently, 
higher U.S. interest rates, attracting foreign capital 
and adding further upward pressure on the dollar. ~n 
short, conventional economic analysis suggests that 
gains made by U.S. industries which compete with 
imports would be substantially, if not entirely, 
offset by losses to U.S. exporting industries. 
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b. Budget Deficit. The best effect on U.S. foreign 
trade and the U.S. economy comes from the increase in 
Government revenues and the reduction 
in the budget deficit. The result 
would probably be easier monetary conditions, lower 
U.S. interest rates, a reduced net inflow of capital, 
and a lower dollar. 
Would this overwhelm the forces leading to a higher 
dollar, noted before? No one can be sure. 
The DRI (Data Resources, Inc.) model 
suggests that this would not happen and 
that, on balance, the proposed import surcharge would 
lead to an appreciation of the dollar (though less 
than would result solely from a cut in imports). In 
short, there is widespread agreement that the revenue 
effects of the surcharge would have desirable 
implications for the U.S. economy. 
Is an import tax the besf tax for the United States 
to use to reduce the budget deficit? An import tax 
raises the price leve'l, alters relative prices and 
distorts the flow of resources. An alternative 
would be a general excise tax which also raises 
prices but on a.broader range of goods and 
consequently does not give windfall profits to 
import-competing firms and does not impose windfall 
costs on U.S. importers and exporters. Alternatively, 
an increase in income taxes could have the same revenue 
effect without raising prices, distorting the flow of 
resources and risking retaliation. The task 
is to select a politically feasible tax that 
will raise sufficient revenue with the least distortion 
in the flow of resources and the least amount of 
international disruption. 
Import Surcharge on Japanese Goods 
There are proposals to place an import surcharge exclusively on Japanese 
goods. Since the increase in Government revenues would be small, $6 to $10 
billion, such a measure would have a much smaller effect on the U.S. budget 
than a general import tax. Thus, the surtax on Japanese goods should be 
examined more from the point of view of trade and foreign policy. 
The U.S.-Japan trade problem is serious. But Japan is only one of our 
problems. From 1980 to 1984, the U.S. trade balance worsened with virtually 
every country. With Japan, it deteriorated by $25 billion. With Western 
Europe, the deterioration was $36 billion. 
A tariff aimed at Japan alone would further erode the principle of MFN 
(most favored nation, or non-discriminatory,) treatment, one of the 
cornerstones of GATT and U.S. foreign trade policy. Non-discrimination is 
crucial for the world's economy. In addition to its important political 
attributes, non-discrimination implies that each country will get its imports 
from the most efficient supplier, or, as a GATT report states, 
non-discrimination "ensures that a given level of protection of domestic 
producers is achieved at the minimum cost for both the protecting country and 
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the rest of the world." Moreover, enforcement of a discriminatory tariff 
dould be difficult, as trans-shipment and fraudulent invoicing would be 
encouraged. 
Nevertheless, Japan's trading practices raise questions about how to deal 
with a country which may be violating agreed rules of international trade. 
The normal course of action would be to raise the issues with the contracting 
parties to the GATT. If Japan were found to be in violation of the GATT, the 
United States (and others) would be entitled to take retaliatory action. 
Unilateral action of the type now being considered by the Congress may be 
appropriate to get greater market access to Japan's market. But this paper 
does not analyze this issue. Rather it focuses on how to deal with a country 
running a large, destabilizing trade surplus. 
There are costs and benefits to a tax on Japanese goods for this purpose. 
The costs are clear. American consumers, importers, and retailers would face 
higher prices. U.S. manufacturers using Japanese products would also face 
higher prices, making it even more difficuit for them to compete on world 
markets. However, the objective of the tax is to shock Japan into opening 
its markets wider to U.S. goods. But would the tax or even the opening of 
Japan's markets reduce Japan's trade surplus? Apparently, it would not. 
The basic reasons for Japan's huge trade surplus are similar to (but the 
reverse of) the reasons why the United States runs a huge trade deficit. In 
Japan, savings are high. Japan saves more than it invests at home. The 
excess of domestic savings over domestic investment turns ,up. as foreign 
investment or an export surplus, the way real resources are transferred 
abroad. Put another way, the excess of savings over investment in Japan 
results in low interest rates; with low interest rates there is a tendency 
for Japanese funds to be invested abroad; the yen is sold and dollars are 
bought so that the yen becomes cheap, stimulating Japanese exports and 
reducing imports. 
The United States, on the other hand, has low personal Savings. They are 
not high enough to cover domestic investment and the government deficit. We 
consume and invest more at home than we produce. The difference is made up 
by importing more goods than we export. The mechanism for achieving this is 
the high interest rate which develops as private investors and the U.S. 
Government borrow more than Americans save; the high interest rate attracts 
foreign funds, bidding up the dollar; the result is higher imports and lower 
exports, providing the United States with the real resources it needs to 
sustain its domestic investment and government expenditures. 
In short, unless Japan were to increase its budget deficit --  it now has 
the tightest fiscal policy of any major industrial country, to tighten its 
monetary policy, or somehow to reduce personal savings, Japan is likely to 
continue to run a huge export surplus. 
This does not mean that Japan does not have a closed market for many 
goods. It probably does. Yet its foreign trade surplus has risen while it 
has been opening its economic borders in recent years. Opening Japan's 
market further, while desirable, would not eliminate its trade surplus, for 
reasons noted above. Imports of some products would rise but the trade 
surplus would persist. 
Moreover, it is important to recognize that the United States places a 
major burden on our tradeable goods sectors by following pol.icies which have 
produced an overvalued dollar. In effect, the high dollar taxes U.S. exp0rt.s 
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to Japan and subsidizes U.S. imports from it by 20-30%. Under these 
donditions, it is not difficult to explain the huge Japanese trade surplus 
and U.S. deficit. 
Trade Policy Considerations 
To deal with a balance-of-payments problem, the GATT allows the imposition 
of temporary import restrictions under Article XII. Import duties, however, 
are not legitimate but quantitative restrictions, (QR's) or quotas, are. 
Such restrictions can only be justified under the GATT when they are used "to 
forestall the imminent threat of, or to stop, a serious decline in ... monetary 
reserves." 
It would be difficult for United States to argue that it is threatened by 
a loss of monetary reserves; these have risen from $19 billion in 1976, to 
$27 billion in 1980 and $34 billion in 1984. While it is recognized that the 
United States has a foreign trade problem (though, according to leading 
estimates, two-thirds of it are the result of the overvalued dollar), the 
balance-of payments clause of Article XI1 of GATT presents a problem for 
justifying the surcharge. 
Qn the other hand, the contracting parties to the GATT decided in 1979 
that import restrictions to protect the balance of payments shall be subject 
to Article XI1 (and XI11 and XVIII) of GATT, but that preference shall be 
given to measures which have the "least disruptive effect on trade." The 
United States argues that an import surcharge is less disruptive than quotas. 
The question is less one of legality under GATT than of the 
appropriateness of import restrictions to deal with an overvalued currency. 
Foreign officials would argue, as U.S. officials have in the past, that first 
step is to get the budget deficit under control. 
President Nixon's 10% import surcharge of 1971 is pointed to as precedent. 
But its objective was to shock other nations into agreeing to a substantiai 
appreciation of their currencies against the dollar in a period of fixed 
exchange rates. The situation is different today when exchange rates are 
floating. (It is interesting to note that the surcharge lasted only from 
Aug. 15, to Dec. 19, 1971, and that half of U.S. imports were exempt from 
the tax.) A GATT Working Party reviewing the 1971 surcharge found that it 
was not appropriate at that time. It might well conclude that it is even 
less appropriate today. 
A Summing Up 
The most compelling argument for an import surcharge is that it would have 
a salutary effect on the U.S. economy through reducing the budget deficit. 
In best case circumstances, a smaller budget deficit might conceivably 
overwhelm the effect of reduced imports and higher U.S. prices and edge the 
dollar down. Moreover, an import surcharge is a tax with some political 
attraction, and thus feasibility, at home. 
However, the case against such a tax is strong. It has serious drawbacks 
.from the point of view of trade and foreign policy and, indeed, from the view 
of avoiding price rises and creating a more efficient tax structure. 
The surcharge functions as a tax -- a temporary and declining one. Thus, 
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a. central question posed for policymakers is whether there are alternative 
taxes which do not have the negatfve economic and political results projected 
for a tax on imports alone. 
LEGISLATION 
H.R. 1139 (Schulze et al.) 
Imposes a 20% import surcharge to be removed country-by-country as it 
concludes a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States. 
Introduced Feb. 19, 1985; referred to more than one committee. 
H.R. 2120 (Lundine) 
Proposes a surcharge on all imports for 2 years, 20% the first 8 months, 
15% the second 8 months, 10% the third (and last) 8 months. The surcharge is 
conditional on getting a cut of $40 billion in the budget deficit each year. 
President can reduce surcharge by half for heavily indebted countries. 
Introduced APr. 18, 1985; referred to Committee on Ways and Means. 
H.Con.Res. 107 (Rostenkowski et al.) 
On Apr. 2, 1985, the House passed a resolution by 349-19 urging the 
President to take "all appropriate measures" to get Japan to end unfair trade 
practices. The resolution also placed part of the blame for the U.S. trade 
deficit on the strong dollar and the budget. Introduced Apr. 2, 1985; 
referred to Committee on Ways and Means. Reported Apr. 2 (H.Rept. 99-35). 
S. 761 (Murkowski) 
Imposes a surcharge on imports from countries that maintain large current 
account surpluses with the United States. If the current account surplus is 
above $16 billion each year for 3 years in a row, the charge would be 20% for 
1 year. If Japan were to run a large surplus again this year, as expected, 
it would be the only country to qualify for the 20% surcharge of the bill. 
Next year it could qualify for a 35% surcharge. Introduced Kar. 26, 1985; 
referred to Committee on Finance. 
S.Con.Res. 1 5  (Danforth et ax.) 
On Mar 28, 1985, by a vote of 92-0, the Senate passed a non-b.inding 
resolution requesting the President to take retaliatory trade measures 
against Japan unless it opened its markets to U.S. goods. Introduced Feb. 
20, 1985; referred to Committee on Finance. Reported Mar. 28, 1985, amended 
and without Written report. 
Proposes a 20% tax on imports for Japan for 3 years. Introduced Mar. 28, 
1985; referred to Committee on Finance. 
S. 1404 (Danforth) 
On July 9 ,  1985, the Senate Finance Committee reported out a bill which 
"determined" that Japan uses Unfair trade practices and requires the 
President to have them eliminated or to retaliate in 90 days (S.Rept. 
99-102). The minimum target Is to negate the cumulative impact of the 
removal of voluntary export controls over autos, suggesting that the 
President's actions must have a $3 to $4 billion effect on increasing U.S. 
exports to Japan or decreasing U.S. imports from that country. S. 1404 was 
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i n t r o d u c e d  J u l y  9 ,  1985; r e f e r r e d  to Committee o n  F i n a n c e .  
